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ABSTRACT
This report describes a three-step, systematic method for selecting
relevant and highly beneficial payloads for the Interim Upper Stage (IUS)
that will be used with the Space Shuttle until the Space Tug becomes
available. Viable cost-sharing strategies which would maximize the num-
ber of IUS payloads and the benefits obtainable under a limited NASA bud-
get were also determined.
To accomplish the first of these objectives, SRI established criteria
for ,justifying candidate IUS experiments/instruments. The three ,justifi-
cation criteria were (1) relevance to accepted objectives, (2) benefit
sufficiency, and (3) non-duplication of purpose. Using these criteria,
SRI conducted an illustrative analysis to ,justify experiments/instruments
and to identify potential sponsors for the justified items. The second
step was to order the ,justified experiments/instruments in terms of impor-
tance. The criteria determined for this step were: (1) level of benefit,
(2) number of application areas benefited, (3) importance of areas bene-
fited, (4) criticality of experiments, (5) timeliness, and (6) special
criteria (such as legislative action, national prestige, and previous
commitments). Candidate experiments were ranked according to these
criteria.
In the third step, SRI established criteria for payload selection
by determining a payload importance function expressed in terms of par-
tial importance factors for: (1) technical compatibility, (2) experi-
ment importance, (3) experiment completeness, (4) sponsorship, (5) time
phasing of costs, (6) immediacy, (7) spacecraft utility, and (8) non-
duplication. SRI then performed example payload selections.
In evaluating various cost-sharing strategies, SRI assessed long-
run marginal cost, short-run marginal cost, average (full) cost, two-part
pricing, and value of service strategies. Each strategy was evaluated
against five criteria: (1) efficiency, (2) equity, (3) sponsor's ability
to pay, (4) recovery of costs, and (5) administrative ease. While par-
ticular advantages were found for using certain strategies in specific
user categories, SRI determined that a flexible cost and pricing system
would be preferred.
The analysis performed in the study with the methodology developed
was constrained to consideration of payloads made up of experiments/
instruments previously defined.
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I INTRODUCTION
The United States has attained a large measure of maturity in its
space programs over the past few years as evidenced by the decision to
proceed with the development of the Space Transportation System (STS),
which provides economical and practical means of orbiting a much larger
number of payloads than previously possible. Another significant indica-
tion of this maturity is the fact that NASA is not content to define
future programs by merely determining what can be done but, rather, what
should be done. The Hearth Committee* has addressed this latter point
at the direction of the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), James C. Fletcher. The findings of that
Committee were consistent with the philosophy expressed in the following
paragraph.
It is now evident that the basic attitudes and priorities in this
country may not permit large amounts of money tc be spent for space spec-
taculars or space endeavors for purely scientific purposes. In order to
obtain support, programs must be structured to improve or maintain the
qualities of life, although some purely scientific endeavors should be
included. The space endeavors should be selected considering the present
needs as well as long-term future needs and requirements. It is now rec-
ognized that NASA, knowing what can be done in space, must continue to
actively seek partnerships with the various portions of the Federal and
State Governments and the private sector that represent and minister to
the various needs of man and attempt to work with these organizations
to develop space efforts that can favorably impact the quality of life.
If this philosophy is adopted, as apparently is being done within
NASA, then NASA will be structuring many of its programs to be responsive
to, and supportive of, the needs and goals of other organizations. This
* This is the name usually given to the Study Group for NASA's "Outlook
for Space" study. Mr. Donald P. Hearth was named Study Director.
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action would have a particular impact on the missions to be flown by
the STS since, in the period between 1980 and 2000, this system will be
used to orbit most of the payloads flown by NASA.
The Interim Upper Stage ( IUS) will be used in conjunction with the
Shuttle until the Space Tug becomes available in the middle 1980's. The
IUS payloads are, therefore, flown early in the STS era and are among
those that will be evaluated by potential users of the STS in their delib-
erations of whether to participate later in the program. It is important
that these payloads be selected to encourage such participation. In the
light of the Hearth Committee findings, this specifically means that the
IUS payloads should be relevant and highly beneficial to quality of life
or scientific needs. The primary objective of the Stanford Research
Institute (SRI) study summarized in this report is to develop a systematic
method whereby IUS payloads can be properly selected. Another objective
is to determine viable cost-sharing strategies for the ,justified payloads
in order to maximize the number of IUS payloads ( and therefore, the bene-
fits) supportable under a limited NASA budget.
To meet the stated study objectives, SRI initiated a NASA-funded
study on May 1 1 1975 with a three-month period of technical performance
and a six-month overall duration. The following tasks were defined to
accomplish the desired goals:
(1) Task 1, Justification of IUS Experiments /Instruments
(Benefit Analysis)
(2) Task 2, Selection Among Justified Experiments
(Importance Ranking)
(3) Task 3, Selection of Payloads
(4) Task 4, Determination of Funding and Cost - Sharing
Approaches.
The analysis in the study was constrained to consideration of the IUS
payloads already identified by General Electric (GE) Company and Fairchild
Space and Electronics Company in their current studies sponsored by
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) to:
(1) Identify multi-discipline applications payloads for
the 1980 ' s that require the Shuttle - IUS geosynchronous
orbiting capability;
2
(2) Develop concepts for such payloads, treating the
Shuttle-IUS combination as a means of providing a
test-bed for quick and economical experimentation
in space; and
(3) Identify the technolology needed for the implementa-
tion of such payloads and concepts.
In each task, the method developed was tested by applying it in case
studies. The time and funding constraints limited the research effort
primarily to the development of methods and the illustration of the
approach using readily available cost and benefit data from existing
studies.
The following pages present a short summary of the major findings
of this study. A more detailed discussion is contained in another volume
of the same title ("User Benefits and Funding Strategies")* hereafter
re.1"orred to as the main report.
* J. L. A.cher, C. F. Day, and N. A. Beauchamp, "User Benefits and Funding
Strategies," Stanford Research Institute, SRI-H-5-283, October 1975.
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II SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS
A. GENERAL
SRI has developed a methodology that allows determining the IUS
payloads of highest importance for a given set of objectives. The method-
ology can be used to subject a list of candidate payloads to a rank-
ordering process, or it can be used to identify the experiments and instru-
ments appropriate for inclusion on high-importance IUS payloads. There are
three major steps involved in the technique: (1) ,justification of the
experiments that make up an IUS payload, (2) importance ranking of these
experiments, and (3) payload selection,
B. JUSTIFICATION OF EXPERIMENTS*
In the first of the three steps in the methodology, experiment
,justification, candidate IUS experiments are subjected to three tests
to determine: the relevance to accepted objectives, the sufficiency
of the related benefits, and the relative worth of the experiment when
compared to alternative approaches. If an experiment passes these tests,
it is said to be ,justifiable; that is, its utility meets some minimum
set of standards to merit its further consideration for inclusion on an
IUS payload.
In determining the relevance of specific experiments to accepted
objectives, only objectives that have generally recognized merit should
be used. The Hearth Objectives serve as an initial set of such objec-
tives that can be used in the early exercising of the methodology. These
objectives (listed in Appendix B of the main report) are likely to change
in time, however, and are probably not complete even in their current
form; for example, little basic scientific research appears ,justifiable
* A more detailed discussion is presented in Section II of the main
report.
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under the ilenrih Objectives listed and communication R&D activities
appear to be deemplinsized. Thus, a monitoring activity is needed within
NASA to determine the timeliness and completeness of the objectives used.
The determination of relevance of the IUS experiments (primarily
in the R&D stage) to accepted objectives could be mncic ,
 without reference
to well defined, non-redundant operational systems:* one could assign
a high relevance rating to n candidate experiment if it has the potential
of making large contrihutlons in support of a given objective, regardless
of whether the system, whose development is supported by the experiment,
is being seriously considered for implementation or not. The numerical
ontries in Tnhie 1 were derive6 in this way. However, the significanc,-
of the results of the relevance test is somewhat vague if this approach
is used, and the benefit sufficiency test that follows the relevance
test is not real'v well defined until one specifies the services provided
by the operational system. Therefore, the appropriate relevance entries
are those derived in the context of n specific set of operational systems.
The systems identified by the Hen rth Committee form a set of non-redundant
operational systems supporting the hearth Objectives. However, the set of
experinKnts/instruments examined by Fni rchi ld does not correspond very
well to the list of instruments idontif'ied b y the Hearth Committee as
requiring additional U-D to field the H- • arth operational systems. Some
correlation sloes exist as indicated in Table 1 where n shaded hox repre-
sents possible utilization of a Fairchild .nstrument in the operational
system proposed by the Hearth Committed for meeting a specific H.•arth
Objective. The lack of complete correlation, however, means thnt deter-
minntion of a fall set of appropriate relevance entries is not possible
at this time. Therefore, the subsequent nnalvses performed for the
Fairchild instruments serve primarily to illustrate the use of the
* An operational s y stem is a non-R&D s y stem which is an integral and
contributing clement in the overall structure set up to perform the
dav-to-clav operations of a user agency. For example, to COMSAT, an
operational system is one that can he relied upon to transmit messages
or data in response to the demands of COMSAT's customers. Such a s y s-
tem does not merely provide a demonstration of technolog y for use in
art advanced system,
K
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methodology and the derived importance rank inga must	 be viewed	 'IS	 pre lim-
inai.o	 until more complete r consistent,	 and	 well	 defined sets of experiments/
instruments and operational systems	 are available,
n
The second test in the experiment ,Justification step of the method-
ology is that of determining the sufficiency of benefits arising from
the candidate experiment. This test is initially made by comparing the
lite-cycle costs of the operational systems) with the benefits that
accrue from implementing the system(s), the development of wh'-ch is sup-
ported by the experiment under consideration. If these costs are less
than the benefits, the experiment passes the test. If the costs exceed
the bene f its, then it must bs determined if some other benefit (for
example, the benefit from basic science experiments) warrants cont'nued
consi eration of the experiment. In utilizing the results of existin;;
benefit analyses, it was determined that only a few IUS experiments may
pass th:, henef,t test without ambiguity. This is clue to uncertainties*
in two	 :ors which markedl y influence the level of benefits obtainable
from implementing a given s y stem: (1) the uncertnint y of the extent to	 ra
which tale services provided will actually be utilized by the potential
users and (2) the uncertainty of the benefits from a specified level
of utilization of the service.
The third and last test in the experiment ,Justification procedure
is to determine if, among the alternative approaches to develop the capn-
bility to field worthwhile operational systems, the candidate IUS experi-
ment offers the best approach. Early in a development program, the answer
to this question may not be known. In this case, competing approaches
(experiments) should be retained as justifiable experiments. As soon aR
the query can be answe-rttd without ambiguity, however, the less desirable
approaches should be drol:ped or, at least, assigned a low importance
ranking. This tradeoff analysis is one of the most critical operations
* As a result of these uncertaintid-,c
ma y
 be only n fraction of th
from an operational system,
thn hnr•r rrnmr.nce roll. --.+	 I
in the entire methodologv.* It was used to identify possibly redundat.t
+	 candidate experiments that could be eliminated from further consideration.
C. RANKING OF JUSTIFIED EXPERIMENTS**
Following the first step, instrument justification, the methodology
1
	
	 then calls for ranking the ,justified instruments in order of importance.
A set of criteria has been identified to effect this ranking. These
criteria are: the level of benefits; the number of application (objective)
areas benefited; the importance of the objectives supported by the experi-
ment; the criticality of the experiment to the implementation of the per-
tinent operational system(s); timeliness of the experiment; and special-case
criteria such as previous commitments, legislative action, and national
prestige.
A technique was developed whereby a quantitative importance level
could be assigned to each candidate IUS experiment, consistent with the
above criteria. The method consists of:
	 (1) determining "partial impor-
tances" related to the level of cost benefits, the timeliness, and the
criticality of the experiment, as well as the importance of each relevant
objective: (2) multiplying these partial importances together for a given
objective; and (3) then, summing over all objectives benefited by the
experiment. Table 2 shows the results of applying the method to the
Fairchild set of experiments/instruments using the entries in Table 1 as
a measure of the criticality of each experiment. The resulting importance
ratings should be viewed with the following caveats, however:
* In fact, unless similar tradeoff analyses aie made at the operational
system level, the analysis for IUS experiments could be somewhat aca-
demic. That is, the operational systems used in the IUS analysis
shou:d first have been shown to represent reasonable, if not the best,
operational systems for supportin l- the objectives. Ln particular, the
operational space-based systems should have heen shown to offer advan-
tages over ground-based or aircraft-based systems.
** A more detailed discussion is in S3ction III of the main report,
I
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Table '2
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE RANKING RESULTING FROM SAMPLE RATING METHOD
1mporIanre Importance Formalized
Level
Fairchild Experiment/Instrument
Rating IlaIing
1,5-m 'Telescope Radiometer 10,E l,u
Integrated Communication Experiment 1u.7 0,99
Ion Engine 10,3 0,95
High Microwave Vertical Atmospheric Sounder 1O.3 0,95
Microwave Measurement of Temperature and Water 9.5tt O.Nstt
Vapor Profiles
Geosynchronous Cloud Physics Radiometer 9,0 O.83
Data CollbCtion System 8.8 0,82
Moderately Itereo  Severe Storm Sensing 7,5 0,7O
High
Millimeter Wave Communication 	 Experiment S,Rtt o,5•ltt
Atmospheric X-Ray Emission Detector 5.5 0.51
Fixed and Mobile Satellite CGmnmunicatlon 5,3 0,49
ttul t iheanl	 I.xper.ment 5,3 0.•19
Millimeter Wave Hroad'tand Experiment •1.8 0.'11
Moderate Fuel Cell 1,7 0.-1-1
I:M Environment	 Ixperiment 1,711 0.4Itt
ItFI	 Investigation
Radar Measurement of Precipitation Rates Over •1.7 0.•11
the Ocean
002 Laser Data Relay Experiment •1,7 0.44
Orbital	 Antenna Range •1,3 0,•IU
orbiting Standards Platform 4,3tt U.40t+
Hyd.umeter At tenuat ion/Depularizat ion Experiment 3.8 0.::5
Moderately Millimeter Wave Satellite-to-Satellite Experiment 3,8 0.35
Low I,iquid	 Metal	 Slip Rings 3,3 0.31
Geosynchronous Laser Reflector 3,2 U.30
Eclectic Satellite Pyroheliometer 3.2 0.30
Iligh Voltage Solar Array	 Ixperiment :I.o o.29
Radar
	 Iuterferometry Localer L,2 0,20
Low
PADS •• 2.0 0.1R
I'A'M'I
	 •• 2.0 O,ln
Itelay	 Station	 I,-r	 Deep	 ;par• • n,n U
• As discussed In main rep>„rt p apparently only one of these is needed.
•• Low rankings for • PADS and PA1" I'I due to lack ill explicit ldontiflc+'tlon of areas o1
appllcatiou in I'able 1. 	 Additional uilorm:ltou could markedly change the t:ud.luti
assigned
+ Inclusion Ill Ilst nut just killed on basis of Ilearth tlb,pecllve,
ft Inclusion of th• -^ experiments to th, • Integ1*11tt • d Communication I'xperuueut lntpll,•s
that these uoml .l ratlnl[s should actually he set equal to zero,
11
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(1) The level-of-benefits 'partial importance" parameter
was set equal to unity for all experiments. It was
not possible to calculate the parameter for each
experiment because the operational systems for the
list of instruments have not been adequately defined.
Therefore, neither the hard benefits nor the total
system costs were available to compute the parameter.
The cost benefit analyses for selected Hearth systems
in Section II-B.3.d of the main report, however, show
that values of less than 0.5 can be anticipated for
the level-of-benefits factor. Thus, subsequent anal-
ysis with more complete data will reduce the importance
ratings of many of the experiments listed in Table 2.
(2) The ratings in Table 2 were derived using the rele-
vance (criticality) factors shown in Table 1. The
entries in Table 1 1 however, must be considered pre-
liminary until the operational systems corresnonAing
to the experiments/instruments are well defined.
When these operational systems are defined, a new
table can be constructed which will reflect realistic
estimates of the experiment/instrument criticality.
Some new entries will be added, and the criticality
ratings of existing entries will probably be modified
either upward or downward. For example, PATTI and
PADS may have much higher importance levels than
shown in Table 2, when subjected to the importance
rating exercise using the complete input data, because
of their intended use in operational systems to provide
accurate pointing and precise time control capabilities
that are critical to optimization of these operational
systems.
(3) The timeliness factor used in this rating exercise
was also set equal to unity in deriving the ratings
shown in Table 2 because the operational systems and
their implementation schedules were not defined.
However, more appropriate values can be determined
when valid data are available. For example, depend-
ing upon the operational systems' deplo yment schedule,
the Ion Engine may not be required before the middle
1990's when the number of communication satellites
and their users becomes so large as to require a
very accurate station-keeping capability. Thus, a
value of 0.5 for the timeliness may be appropriate
for this experiment/instrument in its application
to communications. Similar observations appl y to
the use of this instrument for Power Relay (the enpa-
bility will probably not be needed until many years
after IUS flights). Consequently, reducing the
timeliness factor to its more realistic value of 0.5
for the related Hearth Objectives for these example
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cases would reduce tie normalized importance rating 	 I
from 0,95 to 0,85, wl.ich is still, however, within
the High Importance Lc 'el ,;dLegoi y.
(4) None of the Special Criteria were applied in deter-
mining the importance ratings in Table 2 and only
the Hearth Objectives identified in Appendix B of
the main report were used to define the application
areas considered. Consequently, although the Relay
Station for Deep Space Probes was assigned an impor-
tance rating of 0.0 1 it will have a higher rating if
a space science objective is added to the existing
Hearth Objectives, or if NASA has committed this 	 )z
instrument to an ipproved deep space mission.
Although the rankings shown in Table 2 should be considered prelim-
inary, the paradigm developed in the s t uu:r hsE bet-n shown to be feasible
in application and to yield appropriate importance rankings based on the
preliminary input data available and the criteria identified. A conclu-
sive rank-ordering, however, will depend upon provision of accurate and
complete input data.
D. PAYLOAD SELECTION*
	 i
The third and final step of the methodology consists of formally
selecting high-priority IUS payloads. The following set of night cri-
teria was developed and illustratively exercised to rank_ol •uer previously
defined payloads and to selvcC the experiments for a high-priority payload:
(1) Technical Compatibility: The payload must observe
the weight, volume, and power constraints of the
spacecraft.
(2) Non-Duplication: Experiments should not be dupli-
caterl needlessly on an TUS flight.
(3) Experiment Importance: Preference should be given
to experiments rated high i n importance in the second
step of the methodology (see Section C).	 `M
(4) Experiment Completeness: If a decision is made to
fly an experiment critically needed for an operational
system, all experiments needed for that system should
be scheduled for flight, either on IUS or on other
systems, to assure execution of all required R&D
activities for the operational system.
* A more detailed discussion is in Section lii of the main report,
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f(b) Sponsorship: Preference should be given to experi-
ments for whirl: non-NASA funding sources are most
probable,
(6) Time Phasing: One should time-phase those experi-
ments to be sponsored by a given sponsor to match
his budgetary constraints,
(7) Immediacy: Preference in IUS payloads should be
given to experiments that support rapid deployment
of operational systems.
(H) Spacecraft Utility: Ever y
 a+tc pt shculd be made to
make full 1_ , tilization of the spacecraft capacity on
each fli.-ht.
A quantitative measure of importance for IUS payloads has been
defined by SRI, consistent with the above eight criteria. This measure
has been used to rani: Ordcr ;cial:Led ius payloads proposed by Fairchild.
The pavload importance function was used to construct a method for
selecting IUS payloads in decreasing order of importance where each pay-
load selected is the most important of' all possible IUS payloads for a
specified spacecraft r;a;i^li. : ty and list of candidate experiments, given
the selection of the previous more important payloads. The selection
prccess reduces to a problem in non-linear programming where each experi-
I
	 ment has associated with it a variable that takes on the value 0 or 1,
depending upon whether that experiment is present or absent from the pay-
load. An algorithm exists to perform this selection process without
having to examine all possible payloads.
E. FUNDING STRATEGIES*
Various cost-sharing strategies were assessed for IUS missions,
These included: long-run marginal cost, long-run costs, short-run mar-
ginal cost, average (full) cost, two-part pricing, and value-of-service
strategies. Each strategy was rated against five criteria: efficiency,
equity, sponsor's ability to pay, recovery of costs, and administrative
A more detailed discussion is in Section V of the main report,
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ease. No one strategy was found to offer a clear-cut advantage over the
others for all potential sponsors. Thus, in view of the fact that the
best strategy may vary from one sponsor to another, it is suggested that
NASA maintain a flexible strategy within the constraints imposed by
Congress or other agencies of the government.
The SRI analysis defined the elements of cost to be developed and
ways for assigning common costs. The results provide a basis for using
the following allocation strategies:
(1) Long-run costs - It will be valuable to develop long-
run incremental costs as a yardstick for comparison
even if no costs are actuall y allocated on this
basis, because these costs can be used as a )roxy for
long-run marginal costs, the most efficient strategy
available (in terms of resource allocation). It
should be noted that long-run marginal costs will
approximate those for the short run if Shuttle R&D
costs are excluded and there is only a small impact
from the under- or over-utilization of existing
capacities.
(2) Short-run marginal costs - These costs are readily
estimated on an incremental basis and should be the
basis for charges to other government agencies.
Short-run marginal costs reflect the utilization of
resources actually required to achieve the marginal
launch.
(3) Two-part pricing - Two-part pricing strategies may
be appropriate as a basis for charges to non-government
users. These have the effect of higher than marginal
costs for the first units of service with additional
units priced at the margin.
(4) Average cost pricing - Average cost pricing has the
advantage of recovering all costs associated with a
particular activity. It may be advantageous to use
average cost methods in a two-part pricing scheme.
Particular advantages were found for using a short-run marginal cost
approach for other government agencies and for two-part pricing strategies
for non-government users. However, in many (if not most) cases, no strat-
egy will either enhance NASA's abilitc to attract early participation or
encourage the marginal (next) mission. In addition, it was recognized
that formal attempts to implement cost-sharing strategies may actually
W 7
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inhibit the realization of potential benefits from an operational system
by unfavorably influencing a potential user on his decision to use the
service. Thus, while participation by other government agencies may
be appropriate, attempts to charge ultimate users for service may be
partially self defeating.
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III CONCLUSIONS AND RECONBIFNDATIONS
The major conclusions to be drawn from the SRI study are as follows:
(1) An adequate methodology for selecting .justified,
high-pvioriLy IUS payloads has been developed.
However, the users of the methodology should recog-
nize that:
(a) Objectives must be continually monitored
and updated, as needed, to assure current
political, social, and technical
acceptability.
(b) Justification of manv experiments may have
to be made on the basis of potential, rather
than hard, demonstrable, cost benefits or on
bases other than cost benefits.
(c) The high importance assigned to the IUS
instruments and payloads Felected by the
methodology is dependent .upon identifying
operational systems that have, themselves,
been shown to be the "best" among
alternatives.
(d) Although techniques have been developed
(i) to rant: order candidate IUS
experiments/instruments and previously
defined IUS pa y loads and (ii) to identify
the most important IUS payloads in order
of decreasing importance, each represents
o n l y one possible method (albeit a reason-
able one) wherebv one can systematically
assign a quantitative value to the
"importance" of an experiment or payload.
(2) NASA should maintain flexibility in its funding
strategies because of differences among potential
sponsors and because of possible changes in govern-
mental policy related to setting user charges.
Charging policies appropriate for governmental and
non-governmental sponsors were identified.
In view of the above observations, SRI recommends that the following
steps be taken:
1
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(1) A compatible set of experiments and operational sys-
tems should be identified.
(2) The Henrth Objectives should be expanded to include
space and basic science objectives, if' this has not
alread-v heen done,
(3) The various costs associated with the candidate pav-
loads and experiments should be identified to provide
the data base needed for NASA to determine the actual
costs for a flexible pricing strategy. These data
are needed because many potential sponsors are on
four-year or longer budget cycles, and rather firm
pricing data are needed quickly to enhance the pos-
sibilities of enlisting these sponsors for IUS
flights.
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